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o'Response requested & rec'd. The State concedes that the ~
question whether a warrant i~ req'd for insta11ation"of ,S,
a pen register is open fun this Court, and that "there aJ'" ~
pears to be a split of authority on the subject. tt Howev~fl~
resp says that the decision below was right •• The 4th Ala.! §
vi>rotects the content of conversations, not theffa.ct that i ~
conversations transpired. Telephone users have no expee:4~.,
tation of privacy in the!numbers they dial since (1) the, ;1
7 realize that records of toll calls are kept and have no : 3: I
, clear awareness of the line between toll and local calls S·
nor of the phone co's actual record-keeping practices; F
(2) they'; realize that the numbers called must be reveal ~ ...
to the phone co, since it is through the phone co's swi . rJ·
ing equipment that the calls are completed. Indeed, peo~~l
have even less expectation of privacy as to the numbers is,
dialed than as to bank records or conversations wi th wil'~~Q .
informers, since in the former case there is absolutely i !~ f4
no content conveyed. Since there is no 4th Am protecti ~
in the latter cases, the absence of protection in the f '"
is a fortiori. I agree with ~e~p~ but in view of the
1y strong conflict I would grant. The Court may, howev
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM want to wait til the con
b",'c \,\<:\'f~1 l~,S~ becomes more firmly cemented,
Octuber-2'., 1~'Ja-Ccnferentre- 11/25/78 AGL
-fri.s·'l!-4r-S~3-
No. 78-5374 C~Y
SMITH (robber)
v.
¥~ 3
Cert to Md. ct. App.
(Murphy, Smith, Levine, Orth1
Digges, Eldridge, Cole, dissenting)
MARYLAND State/Criminal Timely
1. SUMMARY: Does the installation of a pen register constitute a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?
2. FACTS: Ms. McDonough was robbed. She gave police a description
of the robber and of a 1975 Monte Carlo that she had observed in her
neighborhood shortly before the robbery. After the robbery, she began
receiving threatening and obscene phone calls from a man who identified
At the request of the police, the telephone company
license number of the vehicle, police learned that the
By tracing the
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o
....
;;
no
Police spotted a man who met thehimself as the person who robbed her.
in petr's name.
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description of the robber driving a 1975 Monte Carlo.
~
Il)installed a pen register at its central offices to record the phone ~
did no~ q
numbers of all calls from the telephone at petr's residence. Police / . i:
o
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n
o
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'"At a pretrial
a warrant or court order before installing the pen register.
Armed with a search warrant, police searched petrls home and
McDonough identified petr as the robber at a line-up.
obtain
home.
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Thereafter, the pen register showed that a call was made to. McDonough'~ ~.
~
~
found a notation of McDonough's telephone number next to petr's phone •.
/
suppression hearing, petr argued that evidence resulting from the
installation of the pen register should be suppressed because absent a
court order or search warrant, the use of a pen register constituted an
illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
trial judge denied the motion, petr was found guilty of robbery and
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. The Maryland Court of Appeals af-
firmed.
3. DECISION BELOW: The majority stated that under Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the question whether installation of a
pen register requires compliance with the Fourth Amendment depends on
"whether a telephone subscriber has a constitutionally protected expec-
((J, tation that the numbers which he dials will remain private. II The court
""-',
held that a subscriber does not have a constitutionally protected ex-·
~
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nA~~aLion of privacy with respect to the numbers dialed for two reason.~
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nirst, every subscriber realizes that the phone company keeps records ~
f;"
~
of toll calls and there seems no valid distinction between the expec- ~.
<il
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tations associated with local calls and toll calls because most sub- ~
~
equipment owned by a third party and therefore it is unreasonable to
content and they are regularly used by the phone company without a
While the Fourth Amendmenta total secret from the phone company.
-/ assume that the fact of one's call passing through the system will rel'A~U ~,'
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protects the content of conversations, pen registers do not reveal that ~
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order "for the purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fra\1d
and preventing violations of the law. II United States v. New York Tel.,
434 u.s. 159, 174-75 (1977). The court found support for its conclusions
in cases dealing with the attachment of transmitters to informants,
inspection of bank deposit slips turned over to the, bank, use of beepers,
and reading of mail covers, all of which either this court or other
courts have held do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The majority
cited several cases in which courts have held that telephone subscribers
have no reasonable expectation that records of their calls will not be
made. See,~, Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 555 F.2d 254
(9th Cir. 1977)~ United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605 (5th eire 1975).
believe
The dissenters / that the installation of a pen register constitute
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. While a subscriber
that completed long distance calls will be recorded, the
does not expect that the phone company will monitor the
cases unpersuasiv.
They found the analogy
- 4 -
"The defendant, by the simple act of dialing local
subscribers are aware of their "local 'call" 'zone because, at least in
telephone numbers of local calls. contrary to the majority's view,
numbers', did not reasonably intend to reveal information: he merely
Maryland, they must dial the prefix "1" before they can make a call
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made use of machinery in particular ways which, without the police in- ~,
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trusion, would have remained fully private."
is placed in the plain view of the public. Finally, the dissenters noted
beyond that zone.
the transmitter-on-informer and bank deposit slip
because the phone company is not a "party" to teleph_o)1e conversations
parties to the conversations or ba'Gk transactions•
the same sense as the informer and bank are' Mail cover cases also
distinguishable since anything written on the outside of an envelope•\-l{)t»'
oJ"ou.k
~~jW'fl ~
that several courts have held that the installation of pen registers is
subject to Fourth Amendment requirements. See,~, Southwestern Bell
Tel. v. united States, 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
u.s. (1978): New York Tel. v. United States, 538 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.
l V'.e.vl & I \5'/1976), eert. denic~, 434 u.s. 1~9 (1977): United states v. Illinois Bell
Tel., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976): United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134
(8th Cir.), cert •. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
4. CONTENTIONS: Petr simply repeats the arguments of the dissenter:
He claims that there is a split among the lower'courts on this question
as evidenced by the cases relied on by the majority and dissenters and
553-54 (1974) "should be dispositive of this issue":
mente The question was specifically reserved in united States v.
- 5
"Because a pen register is not subject to the
provisions of Title III, the permissibility of
its use by law enforcement authorities depends
entirely on compliance with the constitutional
requirements of the Fourth Amendment."
that the court should grant cert in this case to resolve the conflict.
concurring and dissenting, in united states v. Giordano, 416 u.s. 505,
Finally, he argues that the following statement by Mr. Justice Powell,
5. DISCUSSION: This Court has not yet determined whether pen
register surveillance is SUbject to the requirements of the Fourth
Tel., 434 u.s. 159, 165 n. 7 (1977). And in a footnote following the
above-quoted statement by Mr. Justice Powell in Giordano, he stated
---------
he did not have to address the question whether the use of a pen registe~
constitutes a search because, assuming the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment, its requirements were satisfied in that case. 416 U.S. at
554 n. 4. The claimed split in the circuits on this question may be
~more appare~t than real. The court in John specifically declined to
decide whether the use of pen registers constitutes a search. None of
the other cases really addressed the question whether use of the device
is a search~ instead, they simply quoted the statement from Mr. Justice
Powell relied on by petr and assumed that the Fourth Amendment governs
installation of pen registers, apparently without recognizing that Mr.
'to . Justice Powell declined to decide that question. In any event, in all
~ of the cases relied on by the dissenters, the Government had secured a
relied on by the majority, was a § 1983 action ~~inst the telephone
despiteissue,
- 6 -
and not to the fact that the conversation
use of a pen register would not
'those predispositions do differ.
Should the Court be interested in addressing this
court order or warrant before installing the pen register.
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tion of privacy protected
a .
of/telephone conversation
be subject to the Fourth Amendment's
conflict
requirements. Thus, there is no clear / in the "holdings ll of the ca
J seemcited, although the rpre~~c!~ons of the courts citedl obvious and
(' , the lack of a clear conflict below, this case may be a good candidate.
~
The opinions below are well researched and thoughtful, and the factual
setting of this case is uncomplicated and squarely serves up the issue.
There is no response, but I understand that one already ,has been
reque·sted.
10/20/78
CMS
Kravitz Op in petn.
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No. 78-5374
The memo writer is correct that there is no rock-solid conflict
the circuits as to whether installation of a pen register consti-
tutes a "search." Just the same, there is quite a bit of disagree-
~ among them. CAs 2, 7 & 8 have assumed that installation of
pen registers is a search; in each case, however, the GovtJhag".~e­
cured court orders authorizing th~ installations and the CAs held
that these orders were supported by probable cause and h~nce sa~s­
fied the 4th Amend warrant requirement. In Ho*ge, CA 9 held that
installation of a pen register was not a searc , but confined its
holding to the facts of that case, where the telephone co was doing
,its own investigationrof' obscene,ca11s, rather than helping the
Govt investigate crime. In Clegg CA 5 likewise said that installa-
tion of a pen register was l19.t= a search; although, this was not the
"holding" of the case, it was a critical step in the chain of rea- ,'St
soning by which CA 5 reached its holding. Given the evident dispart+~
ty in approach taken by the CAs, the large number of pen register •. ~:
cases that are bubbling up these days, and the fact that the "searclVr' ffi
question is open in this Court, I would be inclined to granteunless
the State's response is very convincing.
-No. 78-.53.74
SMITH
v.
MARYLAND
. Cert to Md CtApps.
(Murphr, Smith, Levine, Orth;Digges, E dridge, Cole dissenting)
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This little case presents one question: whether the installat
prepared to recognize that expectation' (objectively) as' reasonable?
two-pronged inquiry' is appropriate: first, did petr have" an actual
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SUMMAR¥ .. "
The case seems quite easy to me.
of'a pen register constitutes a "search" for purposes
ment, such that a warrant for' tts ,installation is required.
seems to agree that Katz, governs the case, and that Justice Harlan's
as to pen registers.
t:1
<'The parties disagree only as to how these questions should be answers': !a:
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rJI conclude that telephone US~'I~
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in general probably do ~ entertain any expectation of'privacy' as t£, Q
=
. ~the numbers they dial into the nat10nal tele~hone network; and that, ~
~
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, if he did, is soc
even if users do have some expectation of. privacy, this expectation is
not "reasonable." Hence, the installation of a pen register is not a
"search" and no warrant is required.
was robbed. She gave police a description of the robber and of a
1975 Monte Carlo she had observed near her home just before the rob-
bery. After the robbery, she began getting threatening phone calls
from a man identifying himself as the robber. Police saw a man who
met McDonough's description driving a 1975 Monte Carlo in McDonough's
neighborhood. By tracing the license plate number, police learned
1. FACTS
The facts, which were stipulated, are as follows.
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that the car was registered in petr's name.
Ten days after the robbery, the telephone company (Telco), at
residence. (A pen register records only the numbers dialed; it does
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police request, installed a pen register at its central offices to re- ~~
o
cord the phone numbers of all calls made from the telephone at petr's n
o
==(JQ
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'"not reveal the contents of the call, or w~ether the call was completed.)
.tt Police did not get a warrant or court order before having the pen
register installed. The register subsequently revealed that a call
was made from petr's residence to McDonough's phone. The police then
got a warrant to search petr's house; that search turned up
a notation of McDonough's name and number alongside pevr's phone._
Petr was arrested and McDonough identified him in a line-up as the rob-
ber.
At a pre-trial suppression hearing, petr contended that the in-
stallation of a pen register, absent a court order or warrant, was an
illegal search and seizure in violation of the 4th Amendment. On petr's
theory, the evidence gained from the pen register (Le.; the fact that pet:
had called McDonough), and the evidence gained pursuant to the search
warrant issued in. part on the basis of the pen register data, had to be
suppressed. The trial judge denied petr's suppression motion and petr
was convicted. The Md CtApps granted cert directly to the trial court.
-2-
II. DECISION BELOW
The CtApps noted that this Court had reserved decision on the
Under Katz, the answer depended on whe
applicability of the 4th Amendment to pen re~isters. US v Giordano,
416 US 505, 553-54 & n.4 (1974)- (LFP diss;£t\ng); us v NY' Tel Co, 434
answered by reso~t to basic 4th Amendment principles, as enunciated in
Katz v US, 389 US 347 (1967).
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US 159, 165 n.7 (1977). The q'l;1estion whether installation of a registeJ'~
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was a "search" subject to the warrant requirement, therefore, had to be ~
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a telephone subscriber has a constitutionally protected expectation thal~
1;;'
the numbers he dials will remain private. In seeking this answer, ~.
t"'
the CtApps adopted the two-fold test articulated by Justice Harlan in ~
~
his Katz concurrence: "first, a person [must] have exhibited an actual S,
-- ('j
(subjective) expeetation of privacy, and second, that expectation [must~
, ~
be one that society is prepared to recogniz.e as 'reasonable.'" 389 US '"
t at 361.
The CtApps then applied this two-fold test to the facts of this
case. As to actual expectations, of privacy, the court noted that an
expectation of privacy normally extends to the content ofa conversa-
tion, rather than to the fact" that a conversation took place or that a
particular number was dialed. Most phone subscribers, moreover, are
aware that the Telco routinely-makes records of phone calls. It is
true, of course, that the Telco usually maintains tool-call records only
of long-distance calls, not of local ones. Yet most subscriber~, the
court suggested, are unaware of the precise boundaries of their 10-
cal dialing zones, especially when those zones don't coincide with geo-
graphical boundaries. Further, the Telco often keeps records of all
calls from phones subject to a special rate structure. Hodge v Mountain
(f States Tel Co, 555 F2d 254, 266 (CA 9 1977) (Hufstedler, J, concurring).
Although it was difficult to know exactly how much privacy the average
-3-
IYe}~pe~cted with respect to the numbers he dialed, the CtApps
generally possessed a general understanding that
electronic equipment and that s~me record of
calls was made.
Secondly, even if subscribers were vaguely aware that the Telco
did ?otkeep records of local calls, and if they consequently entertained
some expectation of privacy regardigg local numbers dialed, this did
not necessarily mean that society was prepared to recognize that expecta-
tion as "reasonable." All subscribers utilize equipment owned by the
Telco: in order to complete a call, the subscriber must "convey" the
number to the Telco's switching equipment. Under these circumstances,
it would be unreasonable for the subscriber to assume that the fact of
his call's passing through the network will remain a total secret to
the Telco. Once it is conceded'that subscribers have no legitimate
expectation of privacy respecting long-distance calls, moreover, it
would be bizarre to make the existence of a constitutionally-protected
privacy interest depend on how the Telco defined its "local call zone"
or how it organized its billing policy. If the Telco decided to
drop the flat monthly charge, for example, and to record all calls (local
and otherwise) for billing purposes, the Telco would effectively exting-
uish subscribers' privacy interest in the numbers dialed. Once it is
conceded that subscribers have no 'privacy inter-est in toll-billing re-
cords, and that the Telco is free to keep whatever billing records it
chooses, it would be anomalous to say that subscribers have a "legitimatE
expectation of privacy" in locally-dialed numbers simply because the
Telco does not currently choose to keep records of them.
For these reasons, the CtApps concluded that subscribers have no
"legitimate expectation of privacy" with respect to any numbers they
dial. The court derived support for this conclusion from three analogou~
-4-
The first line consisted of cases like US v White,
(1971) (person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
made to informant "wired for sound") and US ~-Miller, 425
(bank depositor has ~o legitimate expectation of privacy
checks and deposit slips in bank's possession). Just as the speaker
in White and the depositor in Miller "took the risk" that the third
party would turn the information over to the Govt, so a subscriber,
real~zing that the n~bers he ,diaLs must necessarily be conveyed to the
Telc~, "takes the risk" that it will in turn hand the information over
to the police. The second line 'of cases involved mail covers, which
the CAs generally have approved. In a mail cover, the Govt views in-
formation on the outside of a sealed envelope travelling through the
mails; the Govt may learn the origin and destination of the envelope,
r--~~~
but not the contents of the letter itself. A pen register was(~~=~
similar,: the Govt learns numerical data indicating the destination of
the call, but nothing whatsoever about the contents of the communication.
The third line of cases involved beepers, which the CAs again have
generally upheld. Just as a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy as to his location when he is travelling about in public, so
a subscriber has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers
he dials into the national telephone network.
For these reasons, the CtApps concluded that, even if subscribers
do have some expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial, this ex-
. pectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as "reason-
able." Congress, in exempting pen registers from Title III of the Omni-
bus Act, obviously expressed the judgment that such devices do not pose
a threat to privacy of the same dimension as the interception of oral
communications. As this Court said in NY Tel Co, pen registers are
regularly used by the Telco, without court order, "for purposes of
'"
'"Q)
'"'tlJ)
=0
u
....
0
t'
c:l
'"'.J:J;:s
=-
.sa
.~
.~
~
....Q.,
'C
CJ
'"=
=c:l
~
Q)
..c::
....
....
0
'"=
.sa
....
CJ
~
'0
U
Q) 7..c::....e
0
J=
"0
Q)
CJ
=
"0
0
'"'Q.,Q)
~
-.::>-
dperations, detecting fraud, and preventing violations
these circumstances, any expectation of privacy as to
dialed over the phone network would be unreason~b1e.
Three judges dissented. The~ believed that subscribers do have
an 'expectation of privacy in their local calls, and that this expectation
was objectively "reasonable." First of all, routine Telco activities
do not include the monitoring of local calls, since most customers pay
for the basic use of Telco equipment at a flat rate. The overwhelming
number of calls, moreover, are local calls. The_majority's assertion
tnat customers are unaware of the boundaries of local-call zones was,
in the dissent's view, mere speculation: in Md, at any rate, callers
had to dial the prefix "1" in order to get out of their local area~
Secondly, subscribers' expectation of privacy was "reasonable." True,
subscribers necessarily entrust, the numbers they dial to Telco electronic
equipment, but it cannot be deduced from this that 'subscribers voluntari-
ly intend to transfer information to the Telco. Subscribers, "by the
simple act of dialing local numbers, do not reasonably intend to reveal
information; they merely make use of machinery in particular ways which,
without police intrusion, wou1~ have remained fully private."
The dissent rejected the "analogies" the majority sought to draw
from other lines of cases. White and Miller, in the dissent's view,
were inapposite: in those cases, the defendant made a knowing and volun-
tary communication to the third party, and thus truly "assumed a risk."
The subscriber, by contrast, 'does not knowingly and voluntarily reveal
information to the Telco. Themail cover and beeper cases were likewise
irrelevant: in those cases, the defendant subjected his letters or his
person to full public inspection; the subscriber, on the other hand, dia]
phone numbers in the privacy of his home, and "reveals" them only to the
inanimate switching equipment of the phone company.
-b-
III. CONTENTIONS
/,i;agrees :with the court below that the outcome here is governed
/and ril~ewise agrees that -Jus t~ce Harlan's two-pronged inquiry is
,applied. Petr simply disagrees with the CtApps as to how the two
questions are to be answered.
(1) Did Petr Exhibit an Actual Expectation of Privacy? Petr
contends that he did: by placing his call to McDonough in the privacy
of his home, petr evinced an intent to shut out the "uninvited eye or
ear" just as Katz did by shutting the door to his public phone booth.
Of course, despite petr's attempt to secure privacy, he necessarily
revealed the number he ,was dialing to the Telco's switching equipment.
As the dissent below said, however, petr did not thereby betray any
subjective expectation of privacy was any less.
(2) Ie Society Prepared to Recognize Petr's Subjective Ex+
subjective intent to transfer information to the phone company; indeed,
since this was a local call, the Telco made no record of it at all. By
making his call in the privacy of his home, petr took reasonable steps
to protect the number he dialed from curious members of the public at
large; by so doing, he manifested a subjective expectation of privacy.
The fact that the number he dialed was recognized as a pattern of beeps
or pulses by Telco switching machinery does not suggest that petr's
tion depends on a balancing of "privacy interests" against "effective
law enforcement interests." On the one hand, the burden on law enforci i
ment should a warrant requirement for pen registers be imposed would
be slight. Obviously, it takes some time to get a warrant, but it take I
time to get any kind of search or arrest warrant; judging" from the nuo
I
ber of pen register cases (~, NY Tel Co) in which the FBI or po1icl
did get a court order prior to installation, petr suggests that the t
Petr suggests that the answer to this ques lpectation as "Reasonable"?
(
a warrant requirement would offer privacy interests is
On the other hand, theing one is probably s+ight.
Petr notes that pen registers can be abused: they may
converted into wiretaps by attaching earphones. See Note,
Duke L J 751, 759. Petr cites congressional. testimony about abuses
of wiretaps, and suggests that pen registers can be similarly abused.
In order to prevent "slippery slope" problems, petr says, a warrant
should simply he 'required for a pen register at the outset. To the
CtApps' argument that subscribers have no "reasonable expectation of
privacy" because they entrust the numbers they dial to the Telco, petr
replies that this reasoning on1y.enhances the expectation of privacy.
If people had a choice as to whose apparatus they used when
communicating with others, the choice of the Telco's equipment might
suggest a voluntary decision to transfer information to a third party.
( But consumers in actuality have no choice--the Telco has a monopo1y--
,
and thus a person's "decision" to reveal a number to the Telco cannot
be said to evidence a voluntary conveyance of information.
For these reasons, petr concludes that he had an actual expectation
of privacy" that this expectation was objectively "reasonable," and
that the logging of the numbers he dialed thus constituted a "search."
Since the search fell within none of the recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement, it was presumptively "unreasonable" and hence'
violative of the 4th Amendment.
B. Resp.
Resp begins by emphasizing that a pen register does not intercept
the content of any communication. As LFP noted in his Giordano dissent,
a pen register
is a mechanical device attached to a given telephone line
and usually installed at a central telephone facility. It
records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from that line.
-0-
I
t does not identify the telephone numbers from which
incoming calls originated, nor does it reveal whether any
call, either incoming or outgoing, was completed. Its
use does not involve any monitoring of telephone conversa-
tions.
keep records of all calls, resp-argues, is of no constitutional signifi-
cance. The facts that all 'numbers dialed are imparted to the Telco, and
that all numbers dialed are capable of being recorded by it, are enough
to negate any reasonable expectation of privacy in the information thus
divulged. The constitutional irrelevance of any "long distance"/"local"
other business purposes. People likewise realize that records of phone
calls are kept, for they see lists of the long-distance numbers they've
called on their monthly bills. The fact'that the Telco does not usually
416 US at 549 n.l. As this Court s&id in NY Tel Co, moreover,
Neither the purport of any communication between the caller
and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether
the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers.
Furthermore, pen registers do not accomplish the "aural
acquisition" of anything. They decode outgoing telephone
numbers by responding to changes in electrical voltage
caused by the turning of the telephone dial (or pressing
of buttons on push button phones) and present the informa-
tion in a form to be interpreted by sight rather than by
hearing.
434 us at 167. The only question in this case, therefore, is whether
the mere recordation of telephone numbers dialed by a subscriber con-
stitutes a "search and seizure" for 4th Amendment purposes. In answer-
ing this question, respagrees with petr and the CtApps that the two-
,2ronged test from Justice Harlan's Katz concurrence, should be applied.
(1) Did Petr Exhibit an Actual Expectation of Privacy? Resp
argues that telephone users in general entertain no real expectation of
privacy in the numbers they dial: as several CAs have said, people nor-
mally expect privacy as to the contents of their calls, not as to the
fact that they have placed a call to a certain number. People realize
that the number they dial is necessarily communicated to the Telco, not
only for the purpose of completing the call, but also for billing and
underscored when one considers that the signals going
a local call are transported by the same equipment that handles
~_~_nistance calls. This equipment is the necessary conduit of all
phone calls, and the "intrusion" effected by a pen register on the
dialer's privacy is identical regardless of what city he is calling.
Under these circumstances, it would bizarre to hold that the dialer's
constitutional rights depended on what the Telco's zone-definition prac-
tices happened to be. Resp, following the CtApps, relies on White,
Hoffa, and Miller, emphasizing that the intrusion here is less than in
those cases, since in those cases the content of the communication was
at stake. Pen registers, by contrast, do not intercept content at all.
(2) Is Society Prepared to Recognize Petr's Subjective Expec-
tation (If He Had One) as "Reasonable"? Resp notes that pen registers
are routinely used for a variety of purpos~s. The Telco uses the~, for
example, to find out ~hether a horne phone is being used to conduct a
business; to check for defective dials; to ascertain billing errors;
and to record all calls from phones subject to special rate structures.
Most importantly, pen registers are routinely used by the Telco to in-
vestigate customer complaints about obscene or harassing calls. Forty-
?
,X, nine States now have statutes making abusive phone calls a criminal of-
fense, and society has recognized tllat pen registers may legitimately be
used as devices for detecting the persons responsible for such calls.
Numerous courts have approved the use of pen registers by the Telco,
as against "invasion of privacy" challenges, for the purpose of ferreting
out violators of the law. Society's recognition that the Telco will
employ pen registers to investigate customer complaints--and that, when
the evidence is gathered, Telco will divulge it to the police--indicates
that an expectation of privacy in the numbers one dials is unreasonable.
In this case, of course, the Telco did not install a pen register on petrI:
phone sua sponte, but was requested to do so by police. Yet this differ-
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obviously be significant for purposes of "state
really insignificant for purposes of "expectation
Once it is accepted that Telco will record numbers
detect misuse of the phone system, it is irrelevant to the dialer whe-
ther Telco is acting on its own or at the Govt's instance. Soci~ty has
recognized that Telco's logging of one's numbers ~~ p~rmissib1e for any
number of legitimate purposes--bi1ling, correcting errors, preventing
abuse. Law enforcement is simply one more such legitimate purpose.
Given this pervasive pattern of permissible recordation, a telephone
user cannot reasonably expect that any particular number he dials will
remain totally private.
After concluding its Katz analysis, resp replies to petr's sug-
gested "balancing process." Resp argues in limine that the premise of
petr's argument here is erroneous. This Court has used a "balancing test"
to ascertain what sort of 4th Amendment protection' (a warrant, for
example, or something less) is appropriate in a given case. The "balanc-
ing test," in other words, assumes that the 4th Amendment is applicable,
whereas the question here is whether pen registers effect a "search or
seizure" such that the 4th Amendment comes into play at all. Even as-
suming that some sort of balancing is proper here, moreover, it would
not, on resp's view, suggest a different result. On the one hand, the
burden on law enforcement imposed by a warrant requirement would be sub-
stantial: the time necessary to secure a warrant may be considerable,
and the usefulness of pen registers will be eliminated entirely in
cases where reasonable suspicion, but no probable cause, exists. On
the other hand, the privacy interests to be protected are slight, since
pen registers leave the contents of communications inviolate. Nor is
there any real possibility that pen registers will be abused, ~, by
being converted into more insidious devices like wiretaps. Law enforce-
ment officers and phone companies alike know the limits of their authori-
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er Title III!, and no "slippery slope" from permissible pen regis-
to impermissible wiretaps need be feared. In any event, this
Court must presume that law enforcement officers will obey the law. It
could just as plausibly be argued that a warrant to search "X" for "Y"
could be abused by police desirous of converting it into a "general
warrant." Yet this possibility is obviously no reason for refusing
to issue the search warrant in the first place.
In sum, resp concludes that the installation of a pen register
effects no "search or seizure" within the meaning of Katz, and that
the 4th Amendment's warrant requirement is thus inapplicable. This
conclusion, on resp's view, is mandated, not only on analysis of people's
realistic "expectations of privacy" in the numbers they dial, but also
on policy grounds.
IV. DISCUSSION.
For me, this is a very simple case. I believe that the installa-
tion of a pen register does not constitute a "search or seizure" and
that the decision below should be affirmed.
A. Actual Expectation of Privacy. The average phone user,
I would suspect, does not harbour any significant expectation of privacy
regarding the fact that he has dialed a particular number on his phone.
All phone users are aware from their monthly bills that the Telco records
long-distance dialings. Som~ users may infer--from the fact that local
calls~are generally governed by a flat rate, rather than a per-c~ll rate-
that the Telco does not usually record local dialings. Yet I wonder how
many subscribers consciously draw this inference: the Telco could have
any number of reasons for keeping track of local calls too--to .gauge the
volume of calls over particular circuits, for example, or to get some
idea of what a fair monthly charge would be:. Phone users, in other words
know for a fact that the Telco records some calls, know for a fact that
-
elco has the facilities for recording all calls, and might well
suspect, if forced to think about it, that the Telco may have reasons
(unrelated to billing, perhaps) for recording local dialings in particulal
On a common-sense level, it seems hard to imagine that people would
seriously think that the numbers they dial into a computerized phone
network will remain a secret from the phone company.
The fact that petr dialed McDonough's number from his own home
does not, to my mind, call for any different conclusion. Contrary to
petr's argument, Katz is quite different from this case. Katz wanted
to keep the contents of his phone call private, and he reasonably took
steps toward this end by shutting the doors to his phone booth. Yet
petr, by the mere act of dialing from home, could not keep the number
he was dialing "secret" from the phone company--regardless of where petr
called from, he would have to reveal that number to the phone company
in precisely the same way. Petr, by calling from home, may well have
evinced a desire to keep the obscene contents of his calls secret; the
numbers he dialed are something else again.
B. "Reasonable" Expectation of Privacy. Even if petr here
had some expectation that the number he dialed would remain private, I
doubt that society is prepared to recognize this expectation as reason-
able. Everyone concedes that a person can have no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the long-distance numbers he dials. The Telco keeps
routine business records of these numbers, and this Court's cases estab-
lish that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in business
records furnished to a third party. Everyone concedes, moreover, that
the Telco in some circumstances does record all dialings from a particula
residence--to check billing errors, to monitor equipment malfunctions, to
trace harassment calls--and that the Telco could rec6rd all dialings if
it chose to. Given this, to make the existence of a constitutionally-
protected privacy interest contingent on the fortuity of a private
's billing practices would be most bizarre. It is, after all,
that we are interpreting. When a person dials a number--
any nurnber--he takes the risk that the Telco will record that number for
a variety of legitimate business purposes. Having taken that risk,
the dialer can claim no reasonable expectation that the number should
remain his little secret.
I think this result is consistent with the trend of this Court's
cases. Viewing the matter broadly, one may suggest that there are two
types of "surveillance" cases. One group consists of cases involving
mail covers, visual surveillance, (through binoculars if necessary),
b-eepers; and the like. These various "devices" are similar in that
they take in what might be called the "externals" of people's activity--
their physical location in space, their name and address, the destination
of their movements and correspondence. These devices, in other words,
keep track only of that which one must necessarily reveal to others in
conducting one's affairs. The other group consists of cases involving
wiretaps of phone calls or opening of letters. Here, where surveillance
necessi'tates taking in the contents of people's communications, the
4th Amendment applies and a warrant is necessary. Pen registers, in my
view, belong quite firmly in the former group. Pen registers, like
mail covers, beepers, and visual surveillance, take in no content: they
take in only the facts that the dialer must necessarily· reveal to others
(here, the phone company) in going about his business. Pen registers
reach only the "externals" of cornmunication--the bare fact that a number
has been dialed. Just as one mp.st "reveal" the outside of an envelope
in order to get it delivered, so one must reveal the number one dials
in order to get the call completed. To the extent that one necessarily
discloses certain data for the purpose of using modern methods of communi
cation, one pro tanto surrenders any "expectation of privacy" as to the
data necessarily disclosed.
-14-
Finally, to hold that installation of a pen register is a "search, I
and thus to hold that such installations are subject to a warrant re-
quirement, would, in my view, Lmpose a serious burden on law enforce-
ment. It is my understanding that 'pen registers are customarily used
in the investigative phase of criminal proceedings: pen registers, that
is, ~re used to help get evidence sufficient to make out probable cause
to arrest or search. _This was the pattern i~ this case: the police
had a suspicion of petr, but perhaps not probable cause; they installed
a pen register, and that produced a key fact--that petr had ca~led
McDonough. On the strength of that fact (plus earlier evidenc,e) the
police got a search warrant; that search turned up yet more incrimina-
ting evidence, and the police then had probable cause to arres~. As
the investigation in this case reveals, therefore, the police ~ften
may not have probable cause at the tLme they need to install a pen
regist~r; if a warrant is required for all installations, therefore,
pen registers will be useless at the early stages of investigations
where the police have nothing but a strong suspicion.
v. CONCLUSION
I conclude that the installation of a pen register is not a search
for 4th Amendment purposes, and hence that no warrant is requi~ed prior
.... ,
l:lo
,'5 to such installations. Accordingly, the decision of the Md CtApps
til
::I
~ should be aff'd.~
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QUESTIONS
For petr:
You have argued that telephon~ users have an "expectation of pri-
vacy" as to the local numbers they dial because the telephone company
does not normally keep records of local calls. Does not your argument
mean that the existence vel non of a constitutionally-protected privacy
interest will depend on the fortuity of a private corporation's bill-
ing policies at any point in time? Does this mode of reasoning strike
you as odd?
HAB--
Here's a draft of Smith v. Maryland. It's a short, rather un-
scholarly opinion, rather befitting the case, which really requires
little more than some common sense and a straightforward application
of ~, Miller, and White. There were five votes at Conference to
hold "no search," and that's the way I've written the opinion; this
follows your Conference vote and my bench memo.
No 7l:,th8.l~On pp. 5 & 6, I've included cites to Rakas v. Illinois, LC
was decided in December of this Term. I've merely put "blank U.S."
cites in the text, but I thought that you might like to know the slip
opinion references for sake of convenience. Here they are:
Page 5: Majority--slip op. at 15, and note 12.
LFP concurring--slip op. at 1, 2.
BRW dissenting--slip op. at 9.
Page 6: Majprity--slip op. at 15 note 12.
LFP concurring--slip op. at 2.
I've included in the pile of materials everything you should need to
do the opinion: a Cornell L Rev article; a Drake L Rev article; xeroxes
of the Baltimore and DC phone books; and the advance sheets of Maryland
Reports containing the opinion below. Everything else that is cited
should be in the Justices' Library.
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,For V.our
Protection·
Abusive Calling False Fire Alarms' I;mployee Identific~tion
It is a criminal offens'e under . It is a crirninal offinse under~, . Cards' '.. ,.' ,
Maryland and Federal Laws for any Maryland law for any person know~ For y'ou~ proie'c~icm, 'every employee
person to make use of telephone ingly to give or cause to be given' carries an official identification cara
facilities and equipment for: any false alarm of fire. This offense ; h ' h' h h
1. Anonymou$ Calls- is punishable by fine and/or im:.: . s oWing IS or er name, p otograp',
and signature, If you have the sligh:
If ina manner' reasonably expected prisonmenL,,; est doubtaboljlpersons who say'
I to annoy, abuse, torment, harass, or they are from the TelephoneCom-
embarrass one or. more persons; or Emergency Calls on pany; please ask to see their card.2. Repeated Calls-· P lO :. ' .
If with intent to annoy, abuse; tor- arty mes Fraud Penalties
ment, harass, or embarrass o[1e or It is a 'criminal offense under Maryland
more persons;.or ,-:' ..' law to refuse to relinquish the use ·of a For your protection, new equipme'nt
3. Any Coniment-. ',. party line immediately when informed and proc'edures en<;lble the Telephone
Request, suggestion, or proposal' that it is needed for an emergency Companyto detect and :investigate
which is obscene; lewd, lascivious, \ " call. It is also an offense to state" fraudulent calls. State J!'lW prOVides
filthy or indecent. ,- falsely th!'lt a party line is needed for' that no person shall defraud or;' .
. ' ,', :, ao emergency call. The law defines" . attempt to. defraud the. Telephone
These offen~e's ar~ punishable by" . "emergency" as "a situation in whith .' Company of its lawfulcharges.
fine and/or imprisonm~nt "naddi- property or human life are In je'opardy Violators, upon conviction, may be
tion, under Federal' law itls also.~~,': an,d the prompt summoning of. aid Is <, sUbject:to imprisor1f11\ent for up to 6
criminal offense for anyone who· essential.'~ This offense is punish~b-'e months Qr. afine of Lip to $500.or· .
knowingly permits any telephone' by fine and/or imprisonment. . both. . .:1;·:\':~~"
under their control to be used in In- . \ '.',., .
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HAB--
I marked the: typos I wasThis looks fine--quite a clean copy.
able to find.
So
~
(')
o;:
As to the repetition of phraseology at pp 5-6, I see what a
you mean. However, I did not intend the two sentences to say the ~
same thing. The sentence on p. 5 says merely that petr is claiming ,~
some legitimate expectation of privacy. The question then becomes, So
~expectation of privacy as to what?" This in turn depends on the ~
nature of the Govt intrusion, which is described at pp 5-6. Based :
on the limited capabilities of pen registers--all they do is record ~
the, numbers dialed--the draft concludes that petr' s claimedrexpecfa; ! 9.'
tion of privacy must relate only to the numbers he dialed.' Hence the! 'S.j
sentence on p 6 that you questioned: "petr's claim necessarily rests ; S!
upon a claim that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy regardinl; g:'
the numbers he dialed on his phone." This sentence does say somethinl!.? ..
different from the sentence on p 5, although as you rightly point " t"'iii
out there is a lot of overlap in the introductory part of the sentenc.¥~~;
Can you think of a way to tone down the overlap, while preserving J '.5
the distinction? One way might be to change "infringed a 'le~itimate;; 0
expectation of privacy' petr held" on p 5 to "infringed some legitimlff (;;1
expectation of privacy' petr held." -, i~i.i
"'11Il "
rJ)
AGL
$I OJ
~ttpt'tUtt<!Jumt ~f tlft~ttitt~ ~mttg
~¥4htllhm. J. <!J. 21lgt'!$
CHAMBERS OF"
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS
May 24, 1979
Re: 78-5374 - Smith v. Maryland
Dear Harry:
The point I intend to make in a short con-
currence may be one that you will be willing to
cover in your opinion, in which event I will
simply join you. It relates to the significance
of the individual's actual or subjective expectation
of privacy. I, would like to make sure that an in-
dividual citizen does not lose his Fourth Amendment
rights in either of two hypothetical situations:
1. Assume that a new Adolf Hitler
installs nationwide loudspeakers notifying
the entire populace that henceforth all
homes shall be open to unwarranted and un-
limited search. Such publicity would
eliminate any actual subjective expectation
of continued privacy, but surely would not
destroy the citizen's Fourth Amendment
protection.
2. Assume that a refugee from a
totalitarian country is unaware of our
traditions of freedom and incorrectly
believes that all his telephone conversa-
tions are being monitored by the secret
police. He should nevertheless retain his
Fourth Amendment protections.
- 2 -
I do not believe your opinion is intended to
disagree with either of these assumptions. However,
unless something. similar to these examples is
expressly disclaimed, I am afraid that the emphasis
on actual expectation of privacy·may be subject to
misreading. Do you think you could put in an
appropriate footnote to make it clear that the
emphasis on actual expectation does not include this
sort·of situation?
Respectfully,
~!tFtUU <!}l1"ttri l1f tltt 'JlttiU~ ~htttg
"'M.ltitt\lhttt.~. <!}. 2nbt~~
CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS
May 24, 1979
RE: No. 78-5374- Smith v. Maryland
Dear Harry:
As a post script to my earlier letter,
this thought has occurred to me. Perhaps the
subjective or actual expectation of privacy is
most important when we are evaluating a claim-
that Fourth Amendment protection should· be
extended into a' new'a'rea--wiretap ·in· Katz and
pen registers here--but would not be relevant
in situations, such as house searches, where
Fourth Amendment protection is well recognized
in our decided cases. This is just a suggestion.
Respectfully,
fL
Mr. Justice Blackmun
..
HAB--
I've seen both of JPS' letters of today, and have drafted
a new fn. 5 to .address his concerns. I was somewhat hesitant about
adopting the suggestion in his second letter--that different inquiries
would be proper depending on whether an "old" or "new" mode of police
surveillance was being used. My hesitancy, I suppose, can be traced
to uncertainty about the ramifications of such a per se rule. I
did, however, try to accommodate JPS' second letter somewhat by
writing, "alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms," in
the footnote. JPS' clerk said this might be satisfactory to his boss.
5/24/79 AGL
P.S. If this looks OK, I can run it by JPS and WHR to see if they're
agreeable; then it could go to the printer in time for circulation to-
morrow. Alternatively, we could just circulate it in typed form.
518-5374-0PINION
SMITH v. :MARYLAND
.(
, .. ' \ I~'
Illinois,-- U. S. -,-, and 11.12 (1978); id., at-', ..,.---
(concurring opinion); id., at ---.-, (dissenting' opinion) ;
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1,7 (1977); Unitea,
States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 442 (1976); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409
U. S. 322, 335.:..336 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U. S.
74~, 752 (1971); (plurality opinion); Mancusi v. DeForte,
392 U. S. 364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. I, 9
(1968). This in uiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan aptly noted in
his atz concurrence, eplbraces two discrete questions.
first is whether the inaividual, by his conduct, has "exhibited
ail aCtual (subjective) expectation of privacy," 389 U. S., at
361-whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individ-
ual has shown that IIhe seeks to preserve lsomething] as pri-
vate." Id., at 351. The second question is whether the
individual's subjective expectation of privacy is "one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonabl~,' " id., at 361-
whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual's·
,..,;.'r-----... ex ectation, viewed objectively, is "justifiabl'[e]" under the
circumstances. ., at 53. See Raka's v. Illinois, -' U.S.,
at - n. 12, id., at - (concurring opinion); United States v.
White, 401 U. S., at 752 (plurality opinion).
j
. ,
I
~
B
In applying the Katz analysis to this case, it is important
'to begin by specifying precisely the nature of the state activ-
ity that is challenged. The activity here took the form of
installing and using a pen register. Since the pen register
waB installed on telepllone company property at the telephone
company's central offices, petitioner obviously cannot claim
that his IIproperty'" ,vas invaded or that police intruded into
1:', "constitutionally protected area." Petitioner's claim,
rather, is that, notwithstanding the absence of a tr~spass, the
State, as did the Government in Katz, infringed a "legitimate
expectation of privacy" petitioner held. Yet a pen register
differs significantly from the listening device employed in
.. '
"
, .--.
2/ Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz' two-pronged
( , inquiry would 'provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment pro tee
tion. For example, if the Government were 'suddenly to announce on
nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to
warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact enterta
any actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and
effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country~ un-
aware of this Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that police
were continuously monitoring his telephone conversations, a subject-
ive expectation of privacy regarding the contents of his calls might
be lacking as well. In such circumstances, where an individual's
subjective expectations had been "conditioned" by influences alien to
well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expecta-
tions obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was. In determining whether
a "legitimate expectation of privacy" existed in such cases, a norma-
tive inquiry would be proper.
24, 1979
letters, I suggest the following:
, '
On'page ~ of tbeoplnton, 10th line, insert
"normallY· ~foJ=~ tb•. word "embraces." '
'.'; - .
John.
In
tbe
jlttptttttt OfltUri ~f tltt 'Juitth jlbdt,g
~lt&'.£titt:ghttt.!D.Of. 2'llbt~~
CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS
May 24, 1979
Re: 78-5374 - Smith v. Mar~land
Dear Harry:
Many thanks. Your changes completely
resolve my problem. I definitely will not
write separately.
Sincerely,
:JL
Mr. Justice Blackmun
MEMORANDUM
No. 78-5374 (TM dissent circulated 6/8/79)
HAB
AGL
Smith v Maryland,
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TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE: eo~(")
s:..
I have studied TM's dissent, and don't think it necessitates W
any response on our part. TM predicates his dissent on his own dis- go
sents in Schultz and Miller, and on JMH' s dissent~ in Wh1t:e,. TM, in , ~
other words, seems to agree that our result isconsJs.t:ent_witlj.t:l1.e Cour*l ~
opinion in Miller, and dissents here only because he dissented there. i;
TM's theory that persons retain an expectation of privacy in infor- a:
mation they divulge to third parties for a limited purtose, dissent §
at 1, 2, 7, was expressly rejected by this Court in Mi ler, as our ~
quotation from that opinion, draft at 8-9, makes clear. TM's theory : ~.
is extremely broad--it would give telephone users a legitimate expecta'"'!,;
tion of privacy, not only in local numbers the Tel Co does ~ record, ~3:
a.lso in toll-call numbers the Tel Co does reoord for billing purposes. S·
TM's theory, in other words, would give telephone users a legitimate F"
expectation of privacy in the Tel Co's business records. Yet Miller ~,
held that a depositor has no legitimate expectation of privacy in a ~
bank's business records. ~
/
WJB, PS, and TM originally voted to
WJB may be able to join TM's dissent without
/
oPinion, however, may pose problems for PS.
opinions in Miller, Couch, and the plurality
TM's dissent is predicated on a rejection of
don~t see how PScan join it.
dissent in this case.
difficulty. TM's
PS joined the Court's
opinion in White. Since
those opinions, I really
o
.....
(")
o
=a
til
MEMORANDUM
HAB
AGL
Smith v Maryland, No 78-5374 (PS dissent circulated 6/13/79)
6713779
I've read PS' dissent and don't think it calls for any respons
PS makes no effort to distinguish this case from Miller and White,
of which he joined. His theory, basically, seems to be the same as
TM's, although TM's frankness prevents PS from joining that opinion
directly.
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:
ij
